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I. Introduction 
In Commonwealth v. Morris,1 the Supreme Court of Virginia 
properly decided that the writs of coram vobis and audita querela 
may not be used to modify a final criminal conviction order more 
than twenty-one days after its entry.2 The court decided the 
inapplicability of coram vobis under Virginia Code § 8.01-6773 
and its own precedent.4 It decided the inapplicability of audita 
querela under the English common law, citing cases from 1670, 
1701, and 1792.5 In the course of the opinion it conflated Virginia 
Code §§ 1-200 and 1-2016 and held in dictum that Virginia’s 
adoption of the common law of England “ends in 1607 . . . . From 
                                                                                                     
  Horace is a judge of an inferior Virginia court and a graduate of 
Washington and Lee School of Law.  
 1. 705 S.E.2d 503 (Va. 2011). 
 2. See id. at 509 (finding that the alleged errors of fact were not sufficient 
for the purposes of coram vobis and holding that the “writ of audita querela may 
not be used to seek postconviction relief from criminal sentences”). 
 3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-677 (2012). 
 4. See Morris, 705 S.E.2d at 506–08 (discussing the coram vobis issue). 
 5. See id. at 508–09 (discussing the audita querela issue). 
 6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-200, -201 (2012).  
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that time forward, the common law we recognize is that which 
has developed in Virginia.”7 This was dictum because the opinion 
holds the common law of England on the use of the writ of audita 
querela was the same before and after 1607.8 Your author 
submits this dictum is erroneous considering the years of decision 
of the English cases cited, the plain meaning of the two applicable 
statutes, and the court’s own precedent. 
Blackstone did not believe the common law of England had 
any force in the American colonies.9 Colonial and republican 
legislation rendered unnecessary a theoretical inquiry on the 
subject in Virginia. After the Restoration, the General Assembly 
in a preamble to a restatement of the law “endeavoured in all 
things (as neere as the capacity and constitution of this country 
would admitt) to addhere to those excellent and often refined 
laws of England, to which we profess and acknowledge all due 
obedience and reverence.”10 The convention that enacted 
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights and first Constitution in May of 
1776 also ordained: 
That the common law of England, all statutes or acts of 
parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth 
year of the reign of king James the first, and which are of a 
general nature, not local to that kingdom, together with 
several acts of the general assembly of this colony now in 
force, . . . shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered 
as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the 
legislative power of this colony.11 
                                                                                                     
 7. Commonwealth v. Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503, 508 (Va. 2011). 
 8. See id. at 509 (“[T]he writ of audita querela, which was part of the 
common law prior to 1607, is the law of the Commonwealth.”). 
 9. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107–08 (noting that “the 
common law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority there”). 
 10. Preamble to the Acts of the General Assembly of 1661–62, in 2 THE 
STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OR VIRGINIA, FROM THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619 41, 43 (William W. Hening 
ed. 1823) [hereinafter HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE]. Note that the spellings in 
this and all subsequent quotations have been carried over from the original text.  
 11. Ordinances of Convention, May 1776, Chap. V, §VI, in 9 HENING’S 
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 10, at 126, 127. “As a general rule a statute 
speaks as of the time it takes effect and not as of the time it was passed.” Cnty. 
Sch. Bd. of Fairfax Cnty. v. Town of Herndon, 75 S.E.2d 474, 477 (Va. 1953) 
(citation omitted). The ordinance did not have a delayed effective date, nor did it 
have an effective date of 1607. It must have spoken as of  1776. In 1789, the 
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The phrase “prior to the fourth year of the reign of king James 
the first” modifies only “statutes or acts of parliament.” Any 
doubt about that is resolved by the phrases: “which are of a 
general nature, not local to that kingdom.” Although some local 
customs were sometimes referred to as the common law, the 
common law properly understood was of a general nature 
throughout England, the ius commune.12 Furthermore, it was the 
common law of England and of no force in Scotland, the Isle of 
Man, or the Channel Islands.13 It would be nonsense to apply 
these phrases to “the common law of England.” By contrast, acts 
of Parliament applied to England and (from 1707 on) Scotland, 
unless Scotland was specifically exempted, and applied to 
dependencies of the Crown and colonies if specifically included.14 
Thus, an act of Parliament could be of a general nature, not local 
to England. The Supreme Court of Virginia so construed the 
ordinance (without the parsing) in Foster v. Commonwealth.15 
This ordinance is now codified at Virginia Code §§ 1-200 and 201, 
which confirm this interpretation of it. 
II. The Statutes 
Virginia Code § 1-200 provides: 
                                                                                                     
General Assembly repealed so much of the ordinance as adopted the acts of 
Parliament, see Laws of Virginia, October 1789, Chap. XVII, §1, in 13 HENING’S 
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 10, at 23, 23–24, but postponed its effective date 
until 1793. See An Act Repealing, Under Certain Restrictions, All Statutes or 
Acts of the Parliament of Great Britain, Heretofore in Force within this 
Commonwealth, in THE REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 135, 135–37 
(1819). The ordinance, as amended, was divided into the two present statutes in 
the Virginia Code of 1849, Title 9, §§ 1 and 2. The statutes have had only a few 
stylistic amendments since then. 
 12. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *63, *67–68 (describing what was 
understood to be the “common law”). 
 13. See id. at *98, *105–06 (discussing the scope of the common law of 
England). 
 14. See id. at *105–08 (discussing the areas that are governed by the 
common law of England); R. v. Cowle, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B.) 598; 2 
Burr. 834, 853 (noting that even if Berwick was “no part of the realm of 
England,” it was still a “dominion of the Crown”). 
 15. 31 S.E. 503 (Va. 1898). The Supreme Court of Virginia also seems to 
have so construed the ordinance in Hanriot v. Sherwood, 82 Va. 1, 15 (1884). 
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The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to 
the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this 
Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, 
and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General 
Assembly. 
Virginia Code § 1-201 provides: 
The right and benefit of all writs, remedial and judicial, given 
by any statute or act of Parliament, made in aid of the 
common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the 
First, of a general nature, not local to England, shall still be 
saved, insofar as the same are consistent with the Bill of 
Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth and the Acts of 
Assembly. 
The latter statute explicitly limits writs made in aid of the 
common law by statute or act of Parliament to those in existence 
in 1607.16 The former statute contains no such limitation.  
“Rule of decision,” the phrase used both in the ordinance and 
§ 1-200, is the principle upon which a disputed issue in a case is 
decided. That was the use of the phrase in the English courts at 
the time of the American Revolution,17 and in the courts of 
Virginia before and after the Revolution.18 One of the English 
decisions, Somerset’s Case,19 would have been well known to the 
                                                                                                     
 16. It seems certain that the writ of audita querela was first used during 
the reign of Edward III (1327–1377). It is uncertain, however, whether the writ 
was created in the courts or by an act of Parliament. See THEODORE F. T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 393–94 (1956) (noting that 
there are grounds for believing the writ was authorized by Parliament in 1336); 
ALFRED W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE 
OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT, 131–32 (1975) (discussing the development of the 
writ of audita querela). Therefore, Morris could not have been decided solely 
under §§ 1-201. 
 17. See generally Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (K.B.) 1047; 1 
Cowp. 204, 208; Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) 509; 1 Lofft 
1, 18; Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 97 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B.) 938; 3 Burr. 1478, 1481; 
Hamilton v. Mendes, (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B.) 792; 3 Burr. 1198, 1209; 
Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, (1752) 161 Eng. Rep. 782 (Consistory) 787, 2 Hag. 
Con. 395, 408. 
 18. See generally Watson & Hartshorne v. Alexander, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 340, 
353 (1794); Kennon v. M’Roberts, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 96, 99 (1792); Shelton v. 
Shelton, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 53, 55 (1791); Giles v. Mallecote, 2 Va. Col. Dec. B71, 
B75 (Gen. Ct. 1738), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN 
THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA 52, 56 (1829); infra note 31 and accompanying 
text. 
 19. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) 509; 1 Lofft 1, 18. 
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members of the Convention of 1776. There, Lord Mansfield 
granted a writ of habeas corpus freeing a slave who had been 
purchased in Virginia and brought to England by his master.20 
If you think this is entirely an academic dispute among 
antiquarians, consider first that the Supreme Court of Virginia 
has relied on or cited English cases four times since January 
2011. Consider second the experience that most Virginia 
attorneys have had at some time. You try to find authority for 
some basic principle of nonstatutory law in Michie’s 
Jurisprudence. You find a statement that precisely fits your need, 
and you look at the footnote for the citation. The only case cited is 
a decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia. If the principle 
of law in question was decided in the English courts and none of 
the exceptions in the statute apply,21 § 1-200 provides that the 
common law of England is “in full force” and makes it your “rule 
of decision.” Nothing ambiguous there. But is it the common law 
of 1607 or 1776? 
III. The Court’s Precedent 
The competence of a wife to testify in a case in which her 
husband was not immediately but might eventually be interested 
was the issue in Baring v. Reeder.22 The court held 3–2 that she 
was competent. The practice at the time was for the judges to 
give separate opinions. Judge St. George Tucker, who three years 
earlier had published the American edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, believed she was not competent and cited an 
English case: 
                                                                                                     
 20. See id. at 510, 1 Lofft at 19 (“Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may 
follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law 
of England . . . .”).  
 21. There is also the judicially created “incompatible with our situation” 
exception. See infra notes 35–38, 46, and 51 and accompanying text. The 
exception seems to have its origin in Thornton v. Smith, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 81 
(1792), which found that a declaration in an inferior court must allege that the 
cause sued upon was “within the jurisdiction of the court,” and in Coleman v. 
Moody, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 1, 20 (1809), which noted that the application of 
the common law “adapt[s] . . . to the circumstances of the case” when approving 
the provision of refreshments to jurors in violation of the English rule. 
 22. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 154 (1806). 
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The case . . . which I cite [is] not [ ] a precedent, (for no 
decision in England since our independence commenced, has 
any authority in this Court,) but merely as an apposite case 
decided by able Judges upon the same law which as to this 
point prevails in this country.23 
Judge Tucker’s nemesis on the court,24 Judge Spencer Roane 
(who was in the majority), then went on for two pages about the 
precedential effect of English decisions. He sometimes sacrificed 
clarity for floridity, and he somewhat mischaracterized Judge 
Tucker’s opinion, but he seems not to have felt himself bound by 
any English decision, especially an older one. However, he wrote 
that he could avail himself of English decisions before and after 
the Revolution: 
I do not see why, upon principles of stable and unvarying law, 
such as those of evidence, for example, the epoch of our 
independence should be clutched with so much avidity: nor 
that, in relation to such principles, the testimony of Lord 
Mansfield delivered in 1777, is not of equal weight with his 
testimony delivered in 1775. I wish it, however, to be clearly 
understood, that I would not only confine the reception of the 
modern decisions in England to doctrines of this description, 
but would not receive even them, as binding authority. I would 
receive them merely as affording evidence of the opinions of 
eminent Judges as to the doctrines in question, who have at 
least as great opportunities to form correct opinions as we 
have, and are influenced by no motives but such as are 
common to ourselves: and with respect to ancient decisions in 
England, what Judge would wish to go further? Who will 
contend that they are binding authorities upon us, in all cases 
whatsoever? Shall we not have the privilege every day 
exercised in England, of detecting errors of former times? . . . 
[B]ut certain I am, that inasmuch as from the very outset of 
our independence up to this day, this Court, and perhaps every 
other Court in the union, has been in the habit of inspecting 
and acting upon the modern decisions in England, under the 
restriction I have mentioned; and as those decisions have 
become the basis of their judgments, great inconvenience and 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 158. Had Tucker seen the Morris dictum coming, his time might 
have been better spent preparing an American edition of the first edition of Sir 
Edward Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England (1628) rather than William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries. 
 24. See Charles F. Hobson, St. George Tucker, Spencer Roane, and the 
Virginia Court of Appeals, 1804–11, 121 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 1, 2–43 
(2013) (describing Judge Tucker’s relationship with Judge Roane). 
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mischief would result from making a sudden alteration in this 
particular; thereby shaking the authority of our own solemn 
decisions, and re-establishing the authority of such ancient 
decisions in England, as the modern ones, in both countries, 
had detected of error and exploded.25 
Are we to believe that the Convention of 1776, which rebelled 
against the Whiggish Hanoverian regime, intended to adopt as 
the rule of decision in republican Virginia the law of England of 
the early years of Stuart absolutism when the notion of 
Parliamentary supremacy was unheard of and the right to habeas 
corpus was not secure?26 
Some support for 1607 as the time of adoption can be found 
in the opinion of Judge John Green in Stout v. Jackson.27 The 
issue there was the measure of damages a purchaser of land 
could recover from the seller in an action of covenant based on a 
breach of the seller’s warranty of title when the purchaser was 
evicted from the land. To oversimplify, Judge Green held the 
purchaser could recover the value of the land at the time of 
purchase under the ancient action of warrantia chartae. “Thus 
stood the law in England when Virginia was settled, and is now 
our law . . . .”28 Judge Green did not, however, write that our 
adoption of the common law ended in 1607. 
Judge John Coalter held warrantia chartae was an obsolete 
action based on feudal principles that never existed in Virginia. 
He would have given damages equal to the value of the land at 
eviction.29 Judge Francis Brooke agreed with Judge Green on the 
measure of damages on a narrower basis and “regretted that, 
there being but a bare Court, it is not to be finally settled in this 
case.”30 Two of the five members of the court did not participate 
in the decision.31 
                                                                                                     
 25. Baring, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 162–63. 
 26. See WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES, 
THE NEW WORLD 154–57 (1990) (discussing the role of Parliament and the King 
in England during the early seventeenth century); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, 
at *134–35 (discussing the writ of habeas corpus in the seventeenth century and 
abuses that served to defeat the benefit of “this great constitutional remedy”). 
 27. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 132 (1823). 
 28. Id. at 146. 
 29. Id. at 155–71. 
 30. Id. at 171. 
 31. Additional support for 1607 as the year of demarcation can be found in 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed 
forty years ago that “Virginia courts have applied [§ 1-200] to 
justify reliance on contemporary as well as pre-enactment 
common law doctrines.”32 In Long v. Vlasic Food Products Co.,33 
the Fourth Circuit cited Foster v. Commonwealth,34 which 
adopted the common law rule that a boy under the age of fourteen 
was conclusively incapable of committing or attempting to 
commit rape, whatever may be the real facts.35 The court in 
Foster cited Hale’s Historia Placitorum Coronae (1736) and 
English cases decided between 1828 and 1893.36 The court also 
compared Virginia’s adoption of the common law and British 
statutes: 
Although, by the terms of the ordinance of 1776, the common 
law was adopted generally and without a qualification similar 
to that annexed to the adoption of the British statutes, yet it 
has always been considered that the same principle governs 
the adoption of the common law. Such of its doctrines and 
principles as are repugnant to the nature and character of our 
political system, or which the different and varied 
circumstances of our country render inapplicable to us, are 
                                                                                                     
the opinion of Justice James Iredell, a North Carolinian, sitting as a circuit 
court judge in United States. v. Mundel, 10 Va. (6 Call) 245 (1795). The issue 
was whether the marshal had a right to require bail of a defendant arrested in 
an action of debt at the instance of the United States under an act of Congress. 
Id. at 253. Justice Iredell concluded that Virginia law controlled as Congress 
had not passed a statute on the issue and that the law of Virginia included “the 
common and statute law of England, as they existed in England, at the time of 
the first settlement of the country” so far as they were applicable to its situation 
and had not been altered by the General Assembly. Id. at 260–61, 263–64, 266. 
He made no reference to the ordinance or to the repeal of British statutes, see 
supra note 11 and accompanying text, but then the facts stated do not indicate if 
Mundel’s arrest occurred before or after 1793. In any event, these statements 
were dicta as Justice Iredell decided a 1788 Virginia statute controlled and was 
the “rule of decision.” Id. at 268. 
 32. Long v. Vlasic Food Prods. Co., 439 F.2d 229, 231 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 33. 439 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 34. 31 S.E. 503 (Va. 1898). 
 35. See id. at 505 (concluding that the common law rule applies, presuming 
“the accused being under fourteen years of age . . . to be incapable of committing 
the crime of rape”). This was changed by 1994 Acts of Assembly, c. 339. See VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61 (2012) (failing to distinguish between accused rapists over 
and under the age of fourteen). 
 36. See Foster, 31 S.E. at 503 (providing English sources for the common 
law rule at issue). 
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either not in force here, or must be so modified in their 
application as to adapt them to our condition. It is a 
reasonable and substantial compliance with the common law, 
“‘whose peculiar beauty is that it adapts itself to the rights of 
parties under every change of circumstances,”’ rather than a 
literal one, which is exacted by its adoption.37 
Thus, the parts of English common law not in force in Virginia 
were to be determined not by their vintage but by their 
compatibility with our political system and circumstances.38 
In U.S. Fidelity Co. v. Carter,39 a bank holding a deposit of 
state and county taxes “closed its doors,” and the bank’s surety 
paid the county treasurer the amount on deposit, was subrogated 
to the treasurer’s rights against the bank’s receivers, and brought 
suit against them.40 The court framed the issues thus: 
The [surety’s] major premise, upon which its whole contention 
rests, is that, by virtue of the adoption by Virginia of the 
common law of England, the Commonwealth became entitled, 
in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, to 
have a debt due to it from an insolvent bank, which has arisen 
from the deposit of public funds therein for or by it, paid in 
preference to the general depositors and other general 
creditors of the bank. If this be not true, there is no basis for 
the preference to which it contends the county and county 
treasurer are entitled. 
To determine whether this primary contention of the appellant 
is well made, it is necessary to consider two questions: 
(1) What was the common law of England, as understood at 
the time of the American Revolution, with reference to the 
right of the king, or crown, to have his, or its, debt paid in 
preference to a debt due by his, or its, debtor to another 
creditor? (2) To what extent, if any, has the Commonwealth of 
Virginia adopted the common law of England on this subject 
as being applicable to debts due it;41 
                                                                                                     
 37. Id. at 504–05 (citations omitted).  
 38. See Shirley v. Shirley, 525 S.E.2d 274, 276–77 (Va. 2000) (making no 
mention of 1607 and relying on an 1840 English decision in holding that the 
common law rule barring a reservation to a stranger to the deed was not 
incompatible with Virginia jurisprudence). Three of the justices in Shirley were 
also on the Morris court. 
 39. 170 S.E. 764 (Va. 1933). 
 40. Id. at 764–65. 
 41. Id. at 766. 
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There followed a lengthy discussion of English law related to 
the King’s right to a preference over a debtor’s other creditors, 
and whether the Commonwealth acceded to the King’s rights by 
the adoption of the common law. The court found that the 
common law regarding the King’s prerogative to have his debts 
preferred had not been adopted in Virginia without modification, 
and it held the Commonwealth did not have such rights for 
commercial debts owed to it, such as deposits in a bank.42 Thus, 
its examination of the common law “as understood at the time of 
the American Revolution” could be considered dictum.43 
As county taxes were included in the money the treasurer 
had deposited in the bank, the court also had to consider whether 
the county was entitled to a preference. The court held it was not 
so entitled: 
In our rather extensive examination of the English precedents 
and authorities we have found no authority which even 
intimates that at the time of the American Revolution any 
political subdivision of the kingdom or body politic was 
regarded as being entitled under the common law of England 
to have its debts preferred.44 
This was not dictum. The decision was unanimous—six of the 
seven justices participated, and Judge Tucker was vindicated. 
The court in Morris made no mention of U.S. Fidelity. 
Since Foster and before Morris, when the court cited § 1-200 
(or its predecessors) and English cases and treatises as the rule of 
decision, it more often cited cases decided and treatises written 
after 1607.45 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 773 (“In the view which we have taken of the case, neither the 
Commonwealth, the county, nor the county treasurer was entitled to any 
preference . . . .”).  
 43. Id. at 766.  
 44. Id. at 772. 
 45. See, e.g., Shirley v. Shirley, 525 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Va. 2000) (citing an 
1840 case); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 648, 651 (Va. 1993) (citing a 
1727 case and postsettlement English treatises); Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 
861, 864–65 (Va. 1992) (citing Blackstone); Williamson v. The Old Brogue, 350 
S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1986) (citing a 1981 Maryland case); Bruce Farms v. Coupe, 
247 S.E.2d 400, 402–03 (Va. 1978) (citing Coke, Littleton (1633) and declining to 
follow 1931, 1938 and 1955 cases); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 189 S.E.2d 678, 
679 (Va. 1972) (citing a 1603 case and then distinguishing it); Evans v. Asphalt 
Roads, 72 S.E.2d 321, 327 (Va. 1952) (citing a 1595 case and Virginia cases on 
the same issue); Carter v. Hinkle, 52 S.E.2d 135, 136 (Va. 1949) (citing an 1884 
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In several cases the court has abrogated the common law as 
previously declared, not because the previous authority was post-
1607, but because the court believed it was no longer compatible 
with contemporary conditions. In Weishaupt v. Commonwealth,46 
the defendant had been convicted of attempting to rape his wife 
and claimed a husband could not be so convicted at common 
law.47 The defendant relied on a statement from Hale that 
supported his position.48 The court found that Hale’s statement 
was not an accurate statement of the common law, and it cited 
English decisions from 1721 through 1974 in support of its view.49 
However, it decided that even under those decisions Weishaupt’s 
conviction would have to be reversed.50 Nonetheless, it affirmed 
the conviction because the English common law on this subject, 
even as of 1974, did not reflect the independence of women in 
contemporary Virginia or “fit our way of life.”51 
IV. Post-Morris Decisions 
In Bevel v. Commonwealth,52 the court restated the Morris 
dictum and cited Blackstone and a 1591 decision, Marsh and his 
Wife,53 in concluding that the death of a convicted defendant did 
                                                                                                     
case); Butts v. Commonwealth, 133 S.E. 764, 768 (Va. 1926) (citing an 1869 
English case and several American cases); Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 130 S.E. 
249, 251 (Va. 1925) (citing an 1801 case). 
 46. 315 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 1984). 
 47. See id. at 850 (explaining defendant’s claims that the statutory law had 
not altered the common law rule adopted by Virginia).  
 48. See id. at 849–50 (quoting “17th century English jurist Sir Matthew 
Hale” for the common law rule). 
 49. See id. at 850 (determining that “Hale’s statement was not law” and 
that he “cites no authority for his view nor was it subsequently adopted, in its 
entirety, by the English courts”). 
 50. See id. at 852 (“The English common law rule, if applied directly to this 
case, would require us to reverse Weishaupt’s conviction.”). 
 51. Id. at 852–54. In three other cases, the court abrogated intrafamilial 
tort immunity, but that was American common law, and no English cases or 
treatises were cited. Surratt Adm’r. v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971); 
Smith v. Kauffman Adm’r, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 113 
S.E.2d 875 (Va. 1960). 
 52. 717 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 2011). 
 53. (1591) 78 Eng. Rep. 481 (Q.B.) 528; Cro. Eliz. 225, 273. 
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not cause the criminal case to abate.54 As Blackstone’s fourth 
volume was cited, it is apparent English law on the question had 
not changed by 1769. A postsettlement English decision was to 
the same effect as Marsh.55 
In Wyatt v. McDermott,56 a 4–3 decision, the majority 
restated the Morris dictum and cited a 1599 decision, not as 
authority for the new tort it recognized of tortious interference 
with parental rights, but rather as some pedigree for it.57 The 
English case had held that a father had a cause of action for the 
abduction of his heir but for no other child.58 
In the court’s most recent reference to English common law, 
Cline v. Dunlora South,59 the majority, in another 4–3 decision, 
cited an 1890 English case regarding tort liability of adjoining 
landowners.60 Neither the majority nor the dissenters mentioned 
Morris. 
*     *     *     * 
You may still be asking what practical effect any of this has. 
The answer: The quantum and usefulness of authority available 
to the Virginia judge or lawyer as the rule of decision. The 
leading authority on Anglo-Virginian legal history has written: 
[T]here are relatively few reports of decisions before 1607 and 
many of these were, by the eighteenth century, antiquated by 
later English developments or inapplicable to the social 
conditions of Virginia, and thus of little use or authority.61 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Bevel, 717 S.E.2d at 795 (determining that the decision of whether 
a criminal case will abate due to the death of the defendant is “more 
appropriately decided by the legislature, not the courts”).  
 55. King v. Ayloff, (1689) 91 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); 1 Salk. 295. The same 
decision seems to be published at 90 Eng. Rep. 375, Comberbach 114. 
 56. 725 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2012). 
 57. See id. at 564 (citing Barham v. Dennis, (1599) 78 Eng. Rep. 1001 
(K.B.); Cro. Eliz. 770). 
 58. See id. (explaining that in Barham it was determined that “a father 
could only seek the pecuniary loss of his heir’s marriage prospects under an 
action of trespass for the taking of his heir”). 
 59. 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012). 
 60. See at 16 (citing Giles v. Walker, 24 Q.B.D. 656 (Eng. 1890)).  
 61. W. HAMILTON BRYSON, VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 2–9 (4th ed. 2005). 
Full disclosure: the clause immediately preceding the quotation states, “English 
cases decided after 1607 were taken to be persuasive rather than binding 
DISAPPEARANCE OF 169 YEARS OF COMMON LAW? 13 
The decisions of the courts are the principal monuments of 
the common law, the lex non scripta.62 Before the Revolution, 
Virginia’s judges were not lawyers and the General Court, the 
colony’s highest, delivered no written opinions.63 There are no 
extant reported decisions before 1728 or between 1741 and 1768, 
and the reported decisions are mostly the arguments of the 
reporter.64 Thus, much of Virginia’s colonial common law 
development is truly a lex non scripta. If the 1607 line of 
exclusion is taken strictly, we are deprived of almost two 
centuries of authoritative common-law development and much of 
the wisdom of Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, Blackstone, 
and Lord Mansfield, the leading judges and writers of the 
Augustan Age of the English common law. 
As a dictum, the statement is not binding in future cases, 
and it is of no real concern if we share Blackstone’s conclusion 
that a subsequent change to the common law does not mean the 
earlier decision was bad law, but that it was not law, it having 
been erroneously determined.65 Nor is it of concern if post-1607 
English cases are followed as the “common law of Virginia.” The 
dictum was nonetheless an unforced66 error. 
                                                                                                     
authority.” Id. It is believed the good professor is Jacobean on the question 
presented. 
 62. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *63 (“The lex non scripta, or 
unwritten law, includes . . . the common law properly so called . . . and, likewise 
those particular laws, that are by custom observed only in certain courts and 
jurisdictions.”). 
 63. See R. T. Barton, Introduction to 1 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS 208–
12, 236 (1909) (noting that “[t]he chief colonial court, however, was the General 
Court,” and it “delivered no written opinions, and generally gave no reasons at 
all for their conclusions”).  
 64. See id. at 1 (explaining that Randolph’s Reports cover cases from 1728 
to 1732 and Barradall’s Reports cover cases from 1733 to 1741); id. at 8–9 
(explaining that Jefferson’s Reports cover cases from 1730 to 1740 and 1768 to 
1772); 1 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS R1-114 (providing Randolph’s reports); 2 
VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS B1-383 (providing Barradall’s reports). Most of 
the decisions of the earlier period in Jefferson’s Reports are from Randolph and 
Barradall. Barton, supra note 63, at 8–9. 
 65. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *70 (“For if it be found that the 
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a 
sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the 
established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined.”). 
 66. Unforced for a second reason: no party in Morris on brief contended 
that Virginia’s adoption of English common law ends in 1607. 
